Political system of iran pdf




















It focuses on both the historical evolution of Iranian political institutions as well as on the processes and phenomena to which these institutions have been exposed.

Democracy in Iran. Looking at the political history of Iran in the modern era, this book assesses the prospects for democracy to flourish there. Arguing that democracy in Iran isn't a sudden development or a western import, it also seeks to understand why democracy failed to grow roots and lost ground to an.

Understanding Iran. Authors: Jerrold D. Matthew Rose - April 18, One of the major debates within the American Criminal Law system is what for of punishment will do the most to deter crime and Property law is the area of law that governs the various forms of ownership and tenancy in both real and personal property.

In the What Is Wahhabism? Matthew Rose - July 14, Wahhabism is a Sunni Islamic doctrine and religious movement that originated in Saudi Arabia in the 18th Century. Religious scholars have described Wahhabism as Politics Comparative Politics. The Political System of Iran. By Matthew Rose. October 1, Tags comparativepolitics iran. He is the creator of OurPolitics. He hopes that his articles can encourage more people to gain knowledge about politics and understand the impact that public policy decisions have on their lives.

Matt is also involved in the preservation of recorded sound through IASA International Bibliography of Discographies, and is an avid record collector. President Joe Biden on November 29 said the new Omicron coronavirus variant is "a cause for concern, not a cause for panic," as federal Read more. International Politics. American Law. Please enter your comment! Please enter your name here. You have entered an incorrect email address! Most Popular. It remains unclear whether he will be able to prevail over his opponents, who hold nearly all the levers of power.

Despite some dire predictions, Khatami has thus far succeeded in holding his own in the internal power struggle with his stronger opponents. Still, he has failed to live up to many hopes pinned on him, unrealistic though some of them were. In light of the strength of the entrenched powers, this should come as no surprise. It can be considered a success that Khatami has neither been caught in the numerous snares and pitfalls of the system, nor resigned, nor discredited himself through substantial compromise of his reform program.

He continues unwaveringly to pursue his goal, which he cleverly seeks to achieve through a many-sided strategy. On the one hand, he avoids violent confrontations on the street; on the other hand, he promotes the development of a civil society by encouraging the media -- especially the newspapers, which have in some ways assumed the role of political parties -- to discuss current controversies.

In the meantime, he seeks to use his influence behind the scenes to win over Supreme Leader Khamenei to his reform program. Whether he can draw Khamenei, with whom he meets once a week, over to his side, is questionable. Khatami's relationship with Expediency Council chairman Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani vacillates between limited cooperation and vicious rivalry, with the emphasis increasingly on the latter since the fall of The main obstacle to the implementation of President Khatami's reform program has until now been the opposition of the legislative and judiciary branches, which have the power to obstruct -- or expedite -- the implementation of the president's liberalization measures.

But the sixth parliamentary elections have the potential to change this. The first round, held on February 18, , ended with a sweeping victory by the reformist candidates. The outcome of that round made clear that the reformists will have at least an absolute majority of seats in the new parliament, or about of seats. Despite their clear victory in the elections, however, the reformists prudently refrained from exuberance and exultation about their triumph so as not to antagonize their defeated opponents more than necessary.

Instead of humiliating them after the first round of the elections, the reformers around Khatami sent the traditionalist right conciliatory messages and gestures, probably because they were aware that the traditionalist right still held the levers of power the Council of Guardians, the Expediency Council, and so forth that could be used all too efficiently against the reformers if they did not honor the traditionalists' "red lines.

If the reformers win the second round of the elections as well -- and many indicators point in that direction -- they will control two-thirds of the seats in the new parliament, which will probably start its formal legislative session in the autumn of Bolstered by such a broad majority, Khatami and his supporters will not have to worry about the traditionalist right opposition to reformist legislation or to Khatami's choice of cabinet ministers.

If the reformers remain united, their main objectives in the next year will probably be the expansion and consolidation of the achievements of Khatami's presidency. In view of the powers of the parliament, the chances are good that the reformists will find success in the areas of press, television, and radio freedoms, which would enhance the flowering of different sectors of Iran's civil society. Much more difficult will be the fight for the creation of a more independent judiciary and for giving the parliament more control over the security services; such demands will directly affect not only the power base of many of the traditionalist-right leaders but even the powers of the supreme leader himself.

Thus, pressure from students, who are pressing for more hasty and radical reforms, and parliamentary demands for increased authority could lead to an intensification of the power struggle between the traditionalist right and the reformists.

The tendency toward schism and factionalism in both camps will probably continue even beyond the parliamentary elections and might even lead to new political coalitions among current opponents.

As long as they have not achieved groundbreaking successes in restructuring the country's political framework, it is unlikely that the reformers will occupy themselves with such complicated tasks as the urgently needed reform of the ailing Iranian economy or the reestablishment of normal relations with the United States. Policy Analysis Monographs. Jan 1, About the Authors. Wilfried Buchta.



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